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A Constitutional Right to a Functioning United States 
Government? Are Shutdowns Unconstitutional? 
Allen E. Shoenberger* 
The constitutionality of government shutdowns has never been tested 
in court, nor has the constitutionality of the related Anti-Deficiency Act. 
Analysis of the Act is virtually absent from published literature. This is 
surprising given the increasing frequency of federal government 
shutdowns. 
The history behind the enactment of the Constitution clearly 
demonstrates that the Framers were interested in creating an effective 
government to replace the demonstratively ineffective government under 
the Articles of Confederation. Closing the government created by that 
endeavor is blatantly inconsistent with the intent of the Framers. 
Shutdowns are fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional plan 
of producing an effective, vigorous government. While the Anti-
Deficiency Act makes some gestures towards preserving some of the 
attributes of the government during a “shutdown,” those gestures are 
woefully inadequate. The Anti-Deficiency Act has its own constitutional 
difficulties. 
The background to the adoption of the Constitution will first be 
analyzed, and then the implications for the constitutionality of the Anti-
Deficiency Act will be discussed. Several different constitutional 
arguments will be examined, including a structural argument, the Take 
Care Clause argument, the Non-Delegation Doctrine, and the Oath 
argument. 
I. Rebellions and Ineptitude
The problems under the Articles of Confederation are best illustrated 
by Shays’s Rebellion, which came only months before the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia.1 Shays’s Rebellion occurred in New England 
* John J. Waldron Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. The author 
acknowledges the support of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Summer Research Stipend 
Program. 
1. Shays’s rebellion was frequently referenced during the convention. See 1 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 18, 48, 318, 406 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318, 332 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); James Madison, Preface 
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because of complaints about taxation and related property foreclosures for 
tax nonpayment.2 This rebellion took place shortly after a first abortive 
attempt to hold a constitutional convention. However, not enough states 
had sent delegates for that convention to proceed. A second convention 
was called for, and partly because of Shays’s Rebellion, enough states 
were now motivated to send delegates to the convention. That second 
constitutional convention produced the draft constitution that was 
eventually ratified. 
The failure of the government under the Articles of Confederation to 
respond to Shays’s Rebellion demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 
existing government. Shays’s Rebellion was only put down by the ad hoc 
organization of temporary militia, paid for by voluntary contributions from 
various merchants.3 That temporary militia raided the federal armory in 
Springfield, Massachusetts, and with weapons from the armory put down 
the rebellion.4 
The national government had proved incapable of responding to the 
emergency of a rebellion. Part of the reason for this inability was the 
bizarre manner of exercising executive power under the Articles of 
Confederation. Although a secretary of war had been appointed, that 
person could only act under directions of a committee of the Congress. 
The secretaries were effectively ‘clerks’ with Congress micromanaging 
everything.5 In fact, “John Jay pronounced Congress ‘unequal’ to the task 
of wielding the executive power.”6 
to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 539, 
547 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). After discussing the Annapolis meeting Madison stated: “[T]he ripening 
incidents [between the Annapolis convention and the meeting of the delegates in Philadelphia] was 
the Insurrection of Shays in Massts. against her Govt; which was with difficulty suppressed, 
notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an apprehended interposition of the Fedl. troops.” 
Id. at 547. No federal troops were ever involved. 
2. Shays’ Rebellion, U.S. HISTORY, www.ushistory.org/us/15a.asp (last visited Sept. 30,
2020). 
3. Id.
4. General Shepard had taken possession of the armory under orders from Governor Bowdoin,
and he used its arsenal to arm a militia force of 1,200. He had done this despite the fact that the armory 
was federal property, not state, and he did not have permission from Secretary of War Henry Knox. 
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 27-28 
(2002); see also JOSIAH GILBERT HOLLAND, 1 HISTORY OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 285-86 
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 1855). 
5. Although the armory had been created by the government under the Articles of
Confederation, no permission was received from the Secretary of War. See RICHARDS, supra note 4; 
HOLLAND, supra note 4. 
6. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 115 (2015) (ebook). 
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In sharp contrast, under the subsequently adopted Constitution, 
President George Washington promptly marshalled three states’ militias 
and put down the next rebellion—the Whiskey Rebellion. The Whiskey 
Rebellion was also a tax protest, involving a tax of six cents a gallon for 
major whiskey producers, but nine cents a gallon for small producers.7 The 
small producers were mostly west of the Appalachian Mountains. These 
producers protested, including by tarring and feathering federal tax 
collectors. President Washington called up the militias of three states and 
led them towards western Pennsylvania from Philadelphia—the capital.8 
That rebellion was quickly put down with no major confrontations and no 
serious bloodshed. 
The next rebellion was the American Civil War. The pattern of 
rebellions almost every five years after independence was broken by 
Washington’s prompt, effective action, thereby demonstrating that the 
new federal government could and would act. 
II. Defects under the Articles of Confederation
Many of the defects of the national government under the Articles of 
Confederation were described by James Madison in his pamphlet, Vices of 
the Political System of the United States.9 The want of sanctions by the 
Government of the Confederacy was among those defects listed.10 
Encroachments by the states on the federal authority, the laws of nations, 
and the rights of other states figured prominently in Madison’s 
complaints.11 Madison also mentioned the want of a guaranty of the states 
and their constitutions against internal violence.12 In a letter of Madison’s 
7. Id.
8. The whiskey tax had been proposed by Alexander Hamilton as a tax on a luxury item.
Washington was concerned about the reaction to the tax but polled various producers of whiskey and 
found they would accept it willingly. It helped that for major producers, the tax could even be lower. 
However, he obviously failed to seek the sentiment of producers from the west of the United States, 
which used whiskey as a substitute for currency and was a useful way of transporting crops from the 
west to eastern markets. The tax was ultimately repealed under the Jefferson administration, and the 
federal government subsequently relied on customs duties. This was the first and only time an 
American President went off to battle leading troops. Subsequently the capital moved to Washington, 
D.C. Peter Kotowski, Whiskey Rebellion, MOUNT VERNON, 
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/whiskey-rebellion/ 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2020); Whiskey Rebellion, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/early-
us/whiskey-rebellion (last updated Sept. 13, 2019). 
9. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in 1 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 166–69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
10. Id. at 167.
11. Id.
12. Id. Shays’s Rebellion was not mentioned. The rebellion effectively ended February 3–4 of 
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to George Washington of April 16, 1787, about the potential contents of a 
new national constitution, Madison states, “An article should be inserted 
expressly guarantying the tranquility of the States against internal as well 
as external dangers.”13 It is clear that Madison was referencing Shays’s 
Rebellion. 
Want of power in Congress was perceived as a problem. Such 
concerns were shared by many leaders of the time. Richard Henry Lee 
mentions that want of power in a letter to George Mason of May 15, 1787: 
“[T]he cry is power, give Congress power.”14 
Lack of an ability to raise and spend money was one of the major 
problems for the government under the Confederation. Edward Carrington 
echoed this refrain, and specifically referenced “the late tumults in 
Massachusetts,” as well as the “[d]elinquencies of the States in their 
foederal [sic] obligations.”15 Carrington went on, “Our tendency to 
anarchy and consequent despotism is felt, and the alarm is spreading.”16 
Prior to the height of the outbreak in Massachusetts, John Jay wrote to 
Jefferson: 
The inefficacy of our government becomes daily more and more 
apparent. Our treasury and our credit are in a sad situation; and it is 
probable that either the wisdom or the passions of the people will 
produce changes. A spirit of licentiousness has infected Massachusetts, 
which appears more formidable than some at first apprehended.17 
Jay specifically identified as a problem “[a] reluctance to taxes.”18 
Earlier that same year, Rufus King wrote to Eldridge Gerry about the sad 
state of the representation of the states in Congress. He went on to state, 
“We are without money or the prospect of it in the Federal Treasury; and 
the States, many of them, care so little about the Union, that they take no 
measures to keep a representation in Congress.”19 
1787—only months before Madison’s writing. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 97 (2005).   
13. James Madison to George Washington, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 9, at 251. 
14. Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (May 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 170. Lee goes on to warn about excessive grants of power, “that every 
free nation . . . has lost its liberty by the same rash impatience . . . .” Id. 
15. Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson (June 9, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 171. 
16. Id.
17. John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1786), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 164–65. 
18. Id. at 165.
19. Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 30, 1786), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
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Under the Articles, the Continental Congress could make treaties, as 
well as declare war and send and receive ambassadors. When that proved 
ineffective, Congress created a Department of Foreign affairs, headed by 
a single officer. But because the secretary was a ‘clerk’ this measure was 
a failure. The “clerk,” John Jay, himself complained decrying the plight of 
hostages and in a letter to Washington said Congress was unequal to the 
task of wielding executive power and that Congress could never act with 
vigor and dispatch.20 
The history is quite clear. Want of an effective national government, 
adequately funded, with an ability to act was a prime mover of those 
leaders who wanted a new form of government at the national level. It is 
fair to state that this desire underpins the entire constitution that emerged 
in September of 1787. For those who hold that Founders’ intent should be 
a major interpretative touchstone for our Constitution, this desire for an 
effective government deserves recognition at the highest level.21 
III. The Drafting of the Constitution
After the proposal of the draft constitution, the theme of the need for 
an energetic government (i.e. one that worked) continued. Alexander 
Hamilton stated, “[I]f we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and 
duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States 
in their collective capacities.”22 James Madison echoed that message in a 
letter to Thomas Jefferson stating, “This ground-work23 being laid, the 
great objects which presented themselves were . . . to unite a proper energy 
in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislative 
departments . . . .”24 
During the ratification convention in Pennsylvania, James Wilson 
stated regarding the President: 
We secure vigor. We well know what numerous executives are. We 
know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in them. Add to 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 162. 
20. PRAKASH, supra note 6.
21. The very first sentence of Federalist Paper No. 1 is: “After an unequivocal experience of
the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new 
Constitution for the United States of America.” THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 1, at 49 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866). 
22. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 305. 
23. Drafting of the Constitution. 
24. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 644. 
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all this, that officer is placed high, and is possessed of power far from 
being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; 
far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private 
character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.25 
In Federalist No. 70 Hamilton wrote, “Energy in the executive is a 
leading character . . . of good government. It is essential to the protection 
of community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady 
administration of the laws . . . .”26 
A. The Take Care Clause
The Take Care Clause of the Constitution is also significant, for it 
mandates the most specific duty of the President.27 During the 
Constitutional Convention little time was spent discussing it. The clause 
was drafted in the committee of style to read: “[H]e shall take care that the 
laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed . . . .”28 That draft 
was a minor rewrite of the language that emerged from the Committee of 
Detail: “It shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful exec—of the 
Laws of the United States (be faithfully executed) to the best of his 
ability.”29 The changes have been described as follows: 
The changes . . . altered law execution in two important ways. First, 
they made law execution a duty and not merely a power. . . . 
Second, the Committee of Detail draft substituted a passive 
construction to describe law execution (that the laws “be faithfully 
executed”), which indicates its expectation that the President would 
oversee the execution of the law by others, rather than do it personally.30 
The Convention then discussed the report of the Committee of Detail, 
but the basic structure of the powers of the presidency, as set forth by the 
Committee of Detail, went unquestioned.31 
25. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 501 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987). 
26. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 506. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
28. Records of the Federal Convention, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 125 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987). 
29. Id. at 124–25.
30. Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson’s Contributions to the Construction of Article II, 17 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 43 (2019). James Wilson was a member of the five-member committee 
of Detail. The most detailed information we have regarding the workings of the Committee of Detail 
comes from Wilson’s papers, but his own draft of Article II was not contained in those papers. 
31. Id. at 46.
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After the government commenced functioning under the new 
Constitution, William Rawle expressed an early view of the clause: 
“The president shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed.” 
The simplicity of the language accords with the general character of the 
instrument. It declares what is his duty, and it gives him no power beyond 
it. The Constitution, treaties, and acts of congress, are declared to be the 
supreme law of the land. He is bound to enforce them; if he attempts to 
carry his power further, he violates the Constitution.32 
The Supreme Court has dealt with the Take Care Clause in a number 
of cases but has never explored its origin in any depth. They have held 
under the clause that the President had authority to appoint a guard to 
protect Justice Fields of the Supreme Court33 and to discharge a postmaster 
from his office.34 On the other hand, the President could not discharge a 
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission35 nor authorize the 
seizure of steel mills during wartime.36 In none of these cases did the 
opinions employ substantial investigation into the origins of the Take Care 
Clause. 
Indeed, Jack Goldsmith and John F. Manning state the following: 
Two things stand out about the Court’s reliance on the Take Care 
Clause . . . . The first is that . . . the Court treats the meaning of the clause 
as obvious when it is anything but that. The Court’s decisions rely 
heavily on the Take Clare Clause but almost never interpret it, at least 
not in any conventional way. . . . 
The second striking element is that the functions that the Court 
ascribes to the Take Care Clause are often in unacknowledged tension 
with one another. For instance, deriving a strong prosecutorial discretion 
from the clause may collide with the scruple against dispensation37 that 
the Court also reads into it. Similarly, the Court has said that the Take 
Care Clause precludes presidential lawmaking while also finding that the 
clause justifies the exercise of a presidential completion power—an 
32. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States (1829), reprinted in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 129 (emphasis added). 
33. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
35. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
36. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
37. Dispensation is the power to omit the execution of a law or, in other words, to dispense
with its application. It was one of the royal prerogatives that was deliberately not given to the President 
in the Constitution. 
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implied presidential authority to prescribe extrastatutory means when 
necessary to execute a statute.38 
The history of the clause has been thoroughly traced though a seminal 
article by Kent, Leib, and Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II.39 
The authors sum up their extensive research: 
We contend that it imposed three interrelated requirements on 
officeholders: (1) a duty not to act ultra vires, beyond the scope of one’s 
office; (2) a duty not to misuse an office’s funds or take unauthorized 
profits; and (3) diligent, careful, good faith, honest, and impartial 
execution of law or office.40 
They found that “take care” references have a long history in English 
jurisprudence. One reference is particularly trenchant in the instant case: 
Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the fifteenth 
century, attribute[d] England’s “excellent Constitution” in part to the fact 
that the king “is circumscribed with Laws which are calculated for the 
good of the Subject . . . that is, to take care that the Laws be duly put in 
Execution, and that Right be done.”41 
The word “faithfully” was particularly important in that history. 
“[F]aithful was linked with words such as diligent, honest, due, careful, 
impartial, and skillful, suggesting an affirmative duty.”42 
The oath43 required of the President by Article II includes a promise 
to “faithfully execute the office of President,” and as Kent et al. conclude: 
The oath or command of faithful execution to an officeholder came to 
convey an affirmative duty to act diligently, honestly, skillfully, and 
impartially in the best interest of the public, a restraint against self-
dealing and corruption, and a reminder that officeholders must stay 
within the authorization of the law and office.44 
Kent et al. assert that “the record we uncovered cuts against 
presidential nonexecution on the basis of independent constitutional 
interpretation.”45 Moreover, they conclude that “[t]he Faithful Execution 
38. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1838 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
39. Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article
II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019).  
40. Id. at 2112.
41. Id. at 2136 (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 133 (John Selden
trans., London, 1775)). 
42. Id. at 2146.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
44. Kent et al., supra note 39, at 2141.
45. Id. at 2186.
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Clauses . . . underscore that ‘[t]he Constitution does not confer upon [the 
President] any power to enact laws or to suspend or repeal such as the 
Congress enacts.’”46 
In other words, the President has no discretion to not enforce laws 
enacted by Congress, nor does he have discretion to pick and choose 
among them: his duty is to faithfully enforce them all. 
IV. What Then Are the President’s Duties When Congress
Has Failed to Pass a Budget? 
Government shutdowns are a relatively recent phenomenon. Although 
Congress enacted the Anti-Deficiency Act in 1884, broad shutdowns did 
not occur until after a set of legal opinions were issued in 1980 and 1981 
by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti which stated that the absence of 
funding required a government shutdown.47 These opinions did not 
consider any potential constitutional issue regarding shutdowns, but only 
whether statutory provisions applied including the Anti-Deficiency Act. 
In neither Attorney General opinion was any consideration paid to whether 
the Constitution controlled, or indeed, whether the Anti-Deficiency Act 
might itself be unconstitutional. Only after these opinions did government 
shutdowns become somewhat routine. 
It has become customary that after a shutdown, all governmental 
employees are paid for their wages lost during the shutdown. Only 
government contractors end up suffering financial loss from a shutdown 
but everyone is betrayed. However, as a result of 2019 amendments, the 
Anti-Deficiency Act now mandates payments to any federal employees or 
District of Columbia employees who are furloughed as a result of a 
shutdown, and any employees who are required to work are also to be 
paid.48 What had been custom has now become law. In effect, furloughed 
government employees now receive paid vacations for workdays that they 
are prohibited from working, although the payments are subject to 
“enactment of appropriations Acts ending the lapse.”49 
46. Id. at 2187.
47. Authority for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (1981); Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in 
an Agency’s Appropriation, 4A Op. Att’y Gen. 16 (1980). 
48. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2) (2018). 
49. Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–1, 133 Stat. 3 (2019); 
Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–5, 133 Stat. 10 (2019) 
(underlying policy for this statutory change is unclear). 
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Does the Anti-Deficiency Act authorize the President to shut down 
parts of the government? The short answer is that it can only do so if the 
Anti-Deficiency Act is itself constitutional. However, the apparent conflict 
with the basic purpose of the adoption of the Constitution—to produce an 
effective, vigorous government—suggests otherwise. Since the Attorney 
General opinions that underpin government shutdowns failed to consider 
any constitutional issue, this remains an open question. The Anti-
Deficiency Act prohibition is associated with both a civil penalty50 and 
with criminal penalties.51 
The statute permits exceptions when public safety or property 
protection is implicated or emergency service is involved.52 The Office of 
Personnel Management of the federal government or the appropriate 
District of Columbia public employer may designate an employee as 
exempted from the act and thus permitted to work. This process has not 
always worked well. For example, in one reported case a convicted cop 
killer escaped from custody because of a shutdown under Reagan and the 
removal of his experienced prison guards.53 More recently, in connection 
with the Boeing Max 747 crashes, a government shutdown delayed FAA 
approval of a fix to the operating system of the airplanes—a fix that might 
have prevented the second Max 747 crash and thus the deaths of 157 
people.54 Certification delays by the FAA also delayed Delta Airlines’ 
ability to utilize brand-new Airbus A220 jets.55 It is clear that no one can 
fully foresee the consequences of shutting down any part of the 
50. 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (2018) (indicating potential removal from office). 
51. 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (declaring a fine up to $5000 and imprisonment for up to two 
years or both). In one of the few cases that mention the Anti-Deficiency Act, District Judge Smalkin 
stated: “[T]he court should not order such an expenditure . . . and if it were to do so, the undersigned 
judge could conceivably be open to criminal prosecution . . . , a situation that might mildly amuse 
some, but which ought to be avoided, if possible.” U.S. v. Nave, 733 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (D. Md. 
1990). 
52. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018).
53. Deanna Paul, A Government Shutdown Once Allowed a Convicted Cop Killer to Escape
Prison. Here’s How., WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/11/previous-government-shutdown-allowed-
convicted-cop-killer-escape-prison-heres-how/. His experienced guards were recalled from the 
hospital to the prison. An unarmed teenager was left to guard him; the means of his escape is unknown.
54. Heather Timmons, Ethiopian Airlines Crash Came After US Shutdown Delayed Boeing
737 Max Fixes, QZ.COM (March 12, 2019), https://qz.com/1570266/ethiopian-airlines-crash-us-
shutdown-delayed-boeing-737-max-fixes/. The airline pilots’ union sent two letters—one Jan. 2, 2019 
and the other Jan. 10, 2019—warning the President of the dangers associated with the shutdown in 
airline production and monitoring. Both the House and Senate leaders were also warned. 
55. Ben Walsh, Delta Air Lines Says the Government Shutdown is Costing It Millions, 
BARRONS (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/delta-airlines-earnings-government-
shutdown-51547565791. 
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government. It is also worth noting that since the issuance of Civiletti’s 
opinions, the federal government has been shut down for a total of 162 
days, or nearly 5 ½ months.56 This is not an inconsequential amount of 
time for large segments of the federal government not to be functioning. 
To assume this is inconsequential blinks reality. 
V. The Take Care Clause
As seen above, the Take Care Clause requires the President to exercise 
diligent, careful, good faith, honest, and impartial execution of his office 
and ensure that the law is carried out. Since the Framers distinctly refused 
to extend the Dispensation power to the President, the President has no 
power under the Constitution to distinguish between the laws that are to 
be enforced. Only if Congress gives him power to suspend a law (assuming 
that Congress itself has the power to do so) can any such distinction be 
drawn. But any such delegation may run afoul of the doctrine of Excessive 
Delegation of Legislative Power. 
VI. Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power
Only two cases exist in which the Supreme Court has held that an 
excessive delegation of legislative power was attempted by Congress: 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan57 and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.58 In 
neither did Congress attempt anything as broad as it did in the Anti-
Deficiency Act. Moreover, in neither of those cases did Congress arguably 
grant the President broad power not only not granted, but rejected, by the 
Framers of the Constitution. Only a single narrow suspension power was 
granted in the Constitution, and that was to Congress, i.e., the power to 
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
56. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gate & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the Longest
Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html. 
57. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Congress had given the President the
power to criminalize shipment of oil beyond that permitted by an extraction state without specifying 
any standards for the President’s actions. 
58. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The President had
been given power to promulgate codes of fair competition drawn up by private commercial groups. 
The cases require that discretion be “canalized within banks.” The exceptions in the Anti-Defamation 
Act for public safety or property protection are incredibly broad. Arguably anything related to property 
or safety, which would include any defense related or foreign affairs related matter, as well as 
commerce related including the FAA, the FTC, the FCC, the FDA, the Justice Department, the Bureau 
of Prisons, the Coast Guard, and even the National Forests and National Parks potentially fit within 
these “exceptions.” For all intents and purposes the discretion is boundless. 
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public Safety may require it.”59 To be sure, Congress was further 
commanded not to draw money from the Treasury except through 
Appropriations by Law but that was a Constitutional command to 
Congress not to the President.60 
The history involving the English King’s suspension power 
controversy culminated with Parliament’s enactment of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689 which declared both the exercise of dispensing power and 
suspending power illegal.61 This was well known to many of the Framers 
of our Constitution. The state delegations to the Constitutional Convention 
unanimously vetoed the idea that the President would have the power to 
suspend the laws.62 
The question then boils down to this: Does Congress have the power 
to delegate to the President the power to suspend laws without itself 
violating the Article II Constitutional text that commands that the 
President take care that the laws be faithfully executed? Moreover, the 
question is not whether Congress’s power of the purse can be employed. 
The questions of whether executive agents may continue to do their jobs 
executing the law, and whether they can also be paid for their service are 
distinct.63 To be sure, Congress is further commanded not to draw money 
from the Treasury except through Appropriations by Law, but nowhere in 
that clause is there a hint that Congress can impede the President’s Article 
II power and duty to see the laws be faithfully executed.64 
VII. The Oaths
There are two oath clauses in the Constitution. One is the Presidential 
Oath contained in Article II: “execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and . . . to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”65 The second oath clause is in Article 
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
60. Id. (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public 
Money shall be published from time to time.”). 
61. BILL OF RIGHTS, (1688) 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (U.K.) (“Dispensing Power. That the 
pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authority without 
Consent of Parliament is illegal. Late dispensing Power. That the pretended Power of Dispensing with 
Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authoritie as it hath beene assumed and exercised of late is 
illegall.”). 
62. James Madison, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, supra note 1, 
at 103–04. 
63. Indeed, at the present time, the only issue is when they can be paid, not whether.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See supra text accompanying note 61.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. The last clause provides the text of the oath: “I do solemnly
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VI—applicable to Senators and Representatives, Members of the several 
State Legislatures as well as to all executive and judicial officers both of 
the United States and of the several States. The second oath is more 
succinct: “to support this Constitution.”66 While this second oath provision 
is seldom the subject of litigation, it must be remembered that each 
executive branch official who has taken this oath, is independently and 
directly bound by the Constitution, and thus, not subject only to 
Presidential directions. Each executive official is subject to the laws of the 
United States as well. 
It is fair to say that today we place little credence on oath taking. 
However, that has not always been the case. During the early period of 
common law, an accused person was not permitted to testify on their own 
behalf, for that would require taking an oath, and breaking an oath 
condemned that person’s soul to damnation. It was presumed that anyone 
accused would lie.67 
The history of the requirement of oath taking and its meaning in 17th 
century England is traced in Faithful Execution and Article II.68 
Blackstone summarized the convoluted history by stating that “English 
law imposed ‘a limitation [on] the king’s prerogative,’ which was ‘a guard 
upon the executive power, by restraining it from acting either beyond or 
in contradiction to the laws.’”69 Subsequent to the Glorious Revolution, 
“Parliament specif[ied] new, simpler versions of the oaths of allegiance 
and supremacy . . . [which in] the coronation oath now also required 
upholding the ‘Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law,’ further 
cementing the Anglican basis of England’s monarchy and government 
class, and making the upholding of statutory law and the established 
Protestant church keys to the monarch’s execution of office.”70 
Oaths including pledges of faithful execution were frequently required 
in the early era of the English colonization of the new world. Besides 
requirements that public officials subscribe to oaths, even incorporated 
churches required oaths of faithful execution by vestrymen and other 
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to 
the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
67. “It was considered certain that the defendant’s fear of punishment, whether he was guilty
or innocent, would cause him to perjure himself, and to avoid this, he was not allowed to testify.” 
Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused’s Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U. L. Q. 454, 
456 (1962) (citing 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 903 (10th ed. 1912)). 
68. Kent et al., supra note 39, at 2149–62.
69. Id. at 2159 (footnotes omitted). 
70. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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officials.71 In every colony the assembly created offices and specified by 
oath or command that officeholders were bound to faithfully execute 
them.72 Such officials numbered in the hundreds, from gagers of casks, 
managers of public lotteries, treasurers, and town clerks, to sergeants 
major of the militia. The list goes on and on.73 Faithful execution was 
consistent with staying within authority, abiding by the law, following the 
intent of the lawgiver, and eschewing self-dealing and financial 
corruption.74 Both civil and criminal law as well as parliamentary 
impeachments helped to define faithfulness in office.75 Civil actions 
included actions to remove a person from office.76 
The Framers of the Constitution were thus well acquainted with not 
only oaths but requirements of faithfulness and with the potential 
consequences for breaches of duties ascribed to officeholders. “By the 
eighteenth century, faithful execution was widely used to describe the 
proper role of a magistrate—to duly, impartially, and vigorously execute 
the laws.”77 “[O]aths of allegiance and faithful execution for state 
officials” were among the first things done by the newly independent state 
governments.78 Each of the states required its chief magistrate be under 
oath to faithfully execute the office, abide by and faithfully apply the law, 
and had no power to suspend the laws or to dispense with their application 
to specific persons.79 The Continental Congress also imposed similar oaths 
and bonds for faithful execution of offices throughout its existence. John 
Jay, for example, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs took an oath of fidelity 
to the United States and an oath “for the faithful execution” of his trust.80 
Indeed, future delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Elbridge Gerry, 
Gouverneur Morris, John Rutledge, James Madison, Roger Sherman, 
Hugh Williamson, and John Dickinson had each drafted “resolves,” or 
resolutions, of the Congress imposing oaths of faithful execution.81 
With that background, the command that both the President and each 
executive official of the federal government by oath should faithfully 
71. Id. at 2165.
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 2166–68.
74. Id. at 2169.
75. Id. at 2170.
76. Id. at 2171.
77. Id. at 2172.
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 2175–76.
80. Id. at 2177.
81. Id. at 2178 (footnote omitted). 
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execute their offices is plain. Neither can any official, President included, 
claim any power to suspend or dispense with the laws. All of these officials 
have fiduciary duties to execute the laws. Members of Congress also are 
bound by an oath, and only if they have some granted power to suspend 
the laws may they do so. It is submitted that nowhere in Article I, Section 
8 is such a power included, and indeed, the fact that a single suspension 
power is granted (with restrictions) in Article IX suggests that Congress 
simply has no such power under the Constitution. Moreover, the Anti-
Deficiency Act stands in stark opposition to the motivating thrust of the 
Framers of the Constitution: a demand for an effective, active government 
at the federal level. 
VIII. Conclusion
It is clear that several serious constitutional problems exist with regard 
to the Anti-Deficiency Act. First, it apparently violates the structural 
implications of the underlying reasons for the adoption of the Constitution. 
Second, it arguably violates the Take Care Clause of Article II in 
interfering with the President’s constitutional duties. Third, the Anti-
Deficiency Act is arguably an excessive delegation of legislative power, a 
delegation of power so sweeping as to be beyond any President’s power 
to manage either by him or herself or as delegated to the executive branch 
Office of Professional Management. Fourth, it appears blatantly 
inconsistent with the promise to the American people of an effective 
government to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for 
the common defense, promote the general Welfare and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty.”82 
Government employees should thus continue to perform their legally 
mandated functions despite a failure of authorized appropriations. When 
they will get paid is a separate matter and since their eventual payment is 
now guaranteed by statute once the funding crisis is resolved, there is 
simply no excuse for failure to perform.83 Some politicians may rue the 
lack of the political tool of government shutdowns, but the Constitution 
was adopted with greater purposes in mind. In the words of Alexander 
82. U.S. CONST. pmbl. A former colleague of mine, George Anastaplo, believed that the 
preamble to the U.S. Constitution was woefully unrecognized for its importance. See George 
Anastaplo, Two “Preambles” for the Preamble of the Constitution of 1787, George Anastoplo’s Blog 
(Oct. 8, 2013), https://anastaplo.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/two-preambles-for-the-preamble-of-the-
constitution-of-1787/. 
83. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203, commands timely payments by 
employers, but does not apply to the federal government, so nonpayment does not violate federal law. 
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Hamilton, “[T]he vigor of government is essential to the security of 
liberty.”84 
84. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 1, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866). 
